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We use logistic analysis to predict the probability of making non-programmed merger in 
a data sample of 45 US banks. Non-programmed merger is the merger that happens next 
to the subject merger but has at least three years apart from the subject merger. We apply 
logistic regression of the occurrence of the non-programmed merger on main 
characteristics of the subject merger. We first examine the effects of each of three 
explanatory variables, which are firstly abnormal return around the approved date, 
secondly hubris management hidden in the subject merger, and thirdly the value of asset 
acquired, on the dependent variable. We then try to find the best prediction model by 
controlling some variables both confounding and rescaling. Our final prediction model 
shows that the probability of making a next merger at least three year after the subject 
merger will significantly decrease if there is abnormal return realized in the subject 
merger. On the other hand, using event study methodology to search for the abnormal 
return of the acquirer’s stock price around the approved date, we prove that the 
information of FDIC s’ merger decision is not totally confidential to public and has 
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Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is not a new but still the most prominent phenomenon 
which has attracted hundreds of global researchers and analysts in the field of finance, 
business or financial economics. M&A was initially triggered in US in early twentieth 
century and recently enter to almost big economies in the world. Many academic studies, 
discussions and international conferences have been debating on the economic profits of 
M&A. Some state that M&A is the superior method of development by acquiring 
competitors and helps acquirer becoming bigger and stronger firm; or purely defensive 
strategy (Jones, Critchfield 2006). Besides, some argue that M&A can ruin the 
competitive market by granting more market power to the successful acquirer thus 
deteriorate the health of the whole economy (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). In 
different point of views, every argument has its own reasonable explanation. M&A is still 
growing as a popular trend and happens every day in every economy even though the 
world economy is experiencing turmoil and crises. 
In this thesis, we focus our analysis on the mergers of US banking industry. The US 
banking industry has experienced many merger waves since 1900s. The long history of 
US banks merger has brought plenty of information and data to academic research fields 
of economics and finance. Most studies focus on single merger and investigate the 
characteristics of individual merger. However, studying on single merger might not 
produce comprehensive knowledge of US bank mergers and acquisitions. Statistical 
evidence based on annual reports of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
the main institution for monitoring US bank mergers, shows that 80% of US banks make 
multiple mergers from 2000 to 2010. Many US banks have multiple mergers in a single 
year or in a longer time interval. There are mainly two points of view on the manner of 
multiple mergers. On the narrow view of individual merger transaction, the typical 
assumption of multiple mergers is that each merger event is identical and equivalent in 
occurrence order and wealth effects of transaction. There are many objections on this 
point of view both based on theoretical and empirical background. The objections are 
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also complemented by studies on multiple mergers. Although studies on multiple mergers 
are limited and not extensive, they strongly show that multiple mergers are not simply the 
combination of separate individual merger but highly interconnected. 
The connection of single merger to multiple mergers has been studied mostly in the field 
of multiple programming mergers (Cohen-Cole and Kraninger (2007), Klemmer, 
Kengelbach, Schwetzler and Sperling (2011)). Multiple programming mergers are 
multiple mergers occur in consecutive years. This manner is also called as planned 
merger program. There can be explanations for the occurrence of programming multiple 
mergers such as the aim of gaining efficiency or market power, or simply the 
overconfidence of the management. As we observe from the database US bank mergers 
from 2000 to 2010 which have been recorded by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
four fifth of the banks have multiple mergers. Programming multiple mergers appear 
mostly in early 2000s, while there are another kind of multiple mergers which we name 
as non-programmed multiple mergers. This kind of merger does not occur in consecutive 
years, it has some interrupted years between individual mergers, apart at least three year 
between two mergers. We are interested in investigation any connection in the non-
programmed multiple mergers. Should the later merger be influenced by the previous 
merger? If in the programming merger, the subsequent merger is programmed to happen 
right after the previous merger no matter what happen on the previous merger, thus in the 
non-programmed merger, is the occurrence of subsequent merger affected by the 
previous merger? Can we predict the probability of subsequent merger using the 
information in the former merger in the case of non-programmed multiple mergers? We 
investigate this question by using logistic analysis to construct a model of prediction. We 
found that abnormal return of the previous merger is a significant predictor of the 
occurrence of the subsequence merger. Our finding is complemented to Cohen-Cole & 
Kraninger (2007) that multiple bank mergers are rational foresight. 
The most different contribution of our study is that we do not examine the abnormal 
return on the announcement date; we use the approval date made by FDIC. Since 1960, 
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The Bank Merger Act of 1960 has assigned roles in merger applications to the FDIC. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act was amended to require the approval of the FDIC for all 
mergers and consolidations between insured and noninsured banks. A US bank which 
want to acquire a target, must submit its merger request to FDIC for approval. FDIC then 
assesses the proposal and decides to approve or not. How does FDIC play an important 
role in US bank mergers? This important role can be justified by analyzing on the effect 
of FDIC decision on the requested bank. We assume that on the day of approval made by 
FDIC, the market reaction on the information can affect the stock price of the requested 
bank for an up-coming merger. In this thesis we use event study to examine the effect of 
FDIC merger decision on the stock price of the requested bank around the approval date. 
We found that FDIC’s merger decision does impact on the stock price of the acquirer 
around the approval date by realizing significant abnormal return. This finding reveals 
the market expectations of the forthcoming merger. We then question on the reliability of 
the previous studies of the wealth effect of the merger to the acquirer and the target when 
they accounted only the effect of the merger on the announcement date. The problem is 
that, since some participants have already known the merger will happen, just soon or late 
does matter, the speculators might manipulate the stock price of both involved party 
which seriously distort the market reaction before the merger is officially announced. 
In order to construct our prediction model, together with the realized abnormal return 
around the approval date, other two components of the previous merger as management 
hubris and the value of asset acquired are applied to the logistic regression to construct a 
prediction model of the probability of subsequent merger s’ occurrence. When regress 
each explanatory variable on the dependent variable - probability of making a next 
merger at least 3 years afterward, we found both abnormal return and hubris have 
significant coefficient. When controlling for a set of variables associated with the 
characteristics of the subject merger, we found that the coefficient of abnormal return is 
strongly affected by the total assets of the acquirer. Our final model shows that the 
probability of making a next merger at least 3 years after the current merger is decreased 
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by 31.87% if there is abnormal return realized in the current merger. Our prediction 
model also has quite high of prediction power which matched nearly 80% of the deals. 
The thesis is structured as follows: section 2 is literature review of bank M&A and 
multiple bank mergers; Hypotheses are comprehensively proposed in section 3; section 4 
describe database and our main methodology used to test the Hypotheses; section 5 is the 

















2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, there are three main parts. Firstly, we will briefly revise some significant 
findings on the literature of the determinants of merge wave in general. Next, we will 
focus on the driving forces and motivations of bank mergers and acquisitions. Final part 
is the most important source of our interest in multiple bank mergers.  
2.1 Determinant Effects  of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The possibly most compelling theory of merger waves bases on the technological 
connection between firms and the same industry. Back to Coase (1937) who suggested 
that increasing scale technological change is an important driver of merger activity. 
According to Jensen (1993), the parallels between merger activity and the technological 
innovations drive the great industrial revolutions of the two latest centuries. Gort (1969) 
and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) based on the valuation discrepancies and Tobin s’ Q 
to relate technology to resource reallocations. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) argued 
a theory where bidders and targets match up based on the degree of their complementary 
resources. 
There are numbers of researches focus on the industry-clustering of mergers. According 
to Andrade and Stafford (2004), mergers play both an expansionary and a contractionary 
role in the industry restructurings. They found evidence of excess capacity during the 
1970s and 1980s which tended to drive industry consolidation though mergers, while 
peak capacity triggered industry expansion through non-merger investment (or internal 
expansion). Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) use performance improvements at the plant 
level to support the neoclassical reallocation theory of merger waves.  
Regarding the main factors driving industry consolidation, five reasons can be intuitively 
identified as mostly accounted to the rapid trend of bank mergers – the regulatory 
deregulation, technological innovations, improvement in financial basements, and 




Amongst the main driving forces of the mergers and acquisitions activities in banking 
industry, regulatory changes have had an important influence on the merger waves. The 
event of Riegle-Neal, this was claimed to not only explanation for the unprecedented 
large number of merger and acquisitions in late 1990s, still is the perfect example of 
deregulatory trend. 
The fact the merger waves are correlated with economic expansions (Andrade and 
Stafford (2004)) and high stock market valuations has also urged the development of 
studies on which merger waves result from the market overvaluation and managerial 
timing. Thus the bull markets more likely lead bidders or acquirers with overvalued stock 
as currency to acquire the assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets or acquired. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), target managements accept overpriced bidder 
stock as they are assumed to have a short time horizon, while in Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) overvalued bidders are more likely to make a takeover during 
market peaks because the synergies are overvalued during these periods. Thus the bidders 
or acquirers are more likely to take over the targets by selling their overpriced stocks. 
That phenomena partially explain for the post-merger underperformance of the acquirer 
or bidders when the market gradually corrects its overvaluation of the merged firm s’ 
shares after the merge. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005), Ang and 
Cheng (2006) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) found that merger 
waves coincide with high market-to-book ratio based on the argument that the market 
overvaluation is reliably explained by the market to book ratios and that investor missed-
estimation tend to drive the merger waves.  
When a firm announces a merger or acquisition deal, there might be substantial 
uncertainty in the market about the effect of the deal, including the concerning of synergy 
effect. According to Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007; Officer, Poulsen, and 
Stegemoller, 2007, asymmetric information regarding the benefits of the deal may cause 
acquirer stockholders to react improperly even to positive net present value deal 
announcements because they are still confused of the “good” or “bad” deal. Thus, the 
9 
 
managers of acquirer may use voluntary synergy disclosures as a signal to alleviate 
shareholder concerns about the value of the transaction. 
Regarding the payment method of a takeover, there are generally three common methods: all-
cash, all-stock, and cash-stock. Yook (2003) found greater bidder gains in all-cash offers when 
the takeover causes downgrading of the merged firm’s debt due to the increase in leverage. 
Schlingemann (2004) argued that, after controlling for the payment method, financing decision 
during the year before the merge play an important role in explaining the bidder gains. Thus the 
debt financing for a merge is not significantly factor of the merger gains. Notably, Toffanin 
(2005) found that the well-know positive market reaction to all-cash bid requires the cash to have 
been financed either using internal funds as retained earnings or borrowing.  
2.2 Literature review of Bank M&A Motivations 
There is a long and thorough literature on why banks merge (Hereafter, we use “mergers” 
for shortening “mergers and acquisitions”). Generally, there are two kinds of motivation 
in bank mergers which are value maximization and non-value maximization. The 
maximizing value is primarily to shareholders’ value, while the later is due to the agency 
problem which arises from the management hubris.  
According to the most comprehensive study of bank mergers, Berger, Demsetz and 
Strahan (1999), value may be maximized through M&A primarily by increasing the 
market power in setting prices or by improving their efficiency. Perhaps the most 
prominent lines of thought relate merger decision-making to potential efficiency gains 
and to market power. Contradictory, management hubris is usually accounted for the 
managers’ private benefits when making mergers decisions. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) 
found evidence that merger bonuses for managers are accounted for managerial power 
but not to the merger deal performance. So managers may have thoughtless to approve 
negative NPV mergers, as long as the mergers do not have serious detriment to the bank 
s’ shareholders, to acquire personal compensations.  
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2.2.1 Efficiency motive of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
Cohen-Cole and Kraninger (2007) suggest that the efficiency motivation for mergers can 
be divided into three categories: economies of scale, economies of scope, and managerial 
effectiveness.  There are many studies on economies of scale and scope which lead to mix 
results. Some find no economies of scale and scope, while few others find a significant 
increase in cost economies with particularly megamergers in U.S banks. Regarding the 
managerial efficacy, it is reluctant to be categorized as value-maximizing motivation or 
non-value maximization in related to the agency problem.  
2.2.1.1 Studies on scale and scope efficiency 
Berger (1987) showed that cost economies of scale only exist for relatively small banks. 
One possible explanation is that by offering a wider range of financial product and 
services, large bank can capture higher market share. Again, many studies after that lead 
to the insignificant change in cost performance of bank mergers (Rhoades 1986, 
Srinivasin 1992, Berger and Humphrey (1991). Recently, more applicable data from 
1990s found that there were more notable scale and scope efficiency achieved from bank 
mergers. Berger and Mester (1997) found the substantial cost scale economies on the 
order of about one-fifth of costs, for bank sizes over $10 billion in assets. Relating to the 
contradiction of results, Akhavein and Berger (1999) argued that there are problems if 
using simple cost ratio in measuring the cost efficiency of bank mergers. The problem 
lied in the fact that output is taken as exogenous variable and the revenue effects on the 
cost performance are not considered and there is no way to solve from cost analysis 
separately whether the cost changes are greater than or less than the revenue performs. 
Base on this argument, Akhanvein and Berger (1999) had proven using profit function to 
find out the significant cost efficiency of “mega-bank” mergers. However, the data on 
mega banks were not pursuable to draw solid conclusions, but the evidences for cost 
efficiency or at least little or no losses from bank mergers appears to be greater overtime. 
According to Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999), this change may in part reflect 
technological progress and regulatory changes. 
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Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) conclude that bank mergers also improve efficiency 
by diversifying the riskiness in the better conditions of a larger scale, a wider 
geographical spread of risks, a wide range of mix and complement products and services. 
Additionally, Milbourn, Boot and Thakor (1999) suggest that in the long term 
diversification from the bank mergers may also improve efficiency through the increasing 
in the management effectiveness. McAllister and McManus (1993) empirically studied 
on data of bank loans proved a significant decrease in the volatility of loan riskiness. 
Under macroeconomic cost of bank capital and liquidity requirements Roger, Jan (2011) 
suggests bank can reduce risky assets by shifting the composition portfolio towards less 
risky assets. Loretta (2005) suggest that merger motive by better diversification which is 
consistent to Benston, Hunter & Wall (1995) finding of US banks that bidders often bid 
more for the targets when they consider the significant achievement of diversification of 
the merger. 
In addition, the objective of accessing to the financial asset safety net through 
consolidation is also remarkable motives for bank mergers. According to Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan (1999), if financial institutions perceive to be “too big to fail”- that 
explicit or implicit government guarantees will protect debt holders or share holders of 
these organizations. Thus, merger may be driven by the incentives to increase the asset 
size, the shares' value, and lower the cost of funding (Sauders and Wilson (1999)). 
However, the financial crisis in 2007 which was turned out from U.S banking system has 
proved this motivation of to be “Too big to fail” less nontrivial. 
2.2.1.2 Synergy effect of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
To sum up, there are several motives that banks evolve in mergers and acquisitions. 
Generally “SYNERGY” is one the most common motives. From the efficiency theory of 
banks mergers we have mentioned, two types of synergies which are corresponding to 
efficiency theory are operating and financial synergy. Thus, the operating synergy 
includes both economies of scale and economies of scope. Milbourn, Boot and Thakor 
(1999) has attempted to answer the question of why banks currently are so interested in 
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strengthening their bank size and their scope of activities. One possible answer is that 
banking industry is getting more competitive, thus banks need to improve their cost 
efficiencies to compete more effectively by enlarging the scale to exploit economies of 
scale. Additionally, the competition in a given period squeezes margins making banks to 
look for other sources of profitability, especially in traditional commercial banking. 
Expanding scope means banks can offer a greater diversified products and services under 
a single brand. 
Financial synergy is more applicable and questionable for bank mergers and acquisitions. 
It implies that the impact of a merge on the cost of capital to both acquirers and the 
merged partners should be lowered is financial synergy exists in that combination.  
Relating the managerial synergy forecasts, Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) reported 
a positive stock price impact of projected synergy estimates for large bank mergers 
during the period from 1985 to 1996. Extensively, Dutordoir, Roosenboom and 
Vascocelos (2010) found that more than 50% of the acquiring firms’ projected synergies 
are smaller than the takeover premium. This indicates that acquirer management s’ 
concern for the litigation costs associated with overestimating synergy. That offsetting 
cost is possibly the main explanation of why not all firms choose to engage in voluntary 
synergy disclosure. 
2.2.1.3 Studies on Managerial Motives  
Simply, the managerial efficacy motivation as dictated by Cohen-Cole and Kranninger 
(2007) that superior management can create value by acquiring the assets of poorly 
managed institutions. Since the inferior management could not realize the bank’s true 
inherent worth, the bank was perpetually undervalued. A plausible story, this explanation 
is very difficult to prove or disprove empirically.  
Existing discussion of managerial motives generally center on empire building. By 
increasing bank assets through consolidation, CEOs can often increase their personal 
compensation dramatically. Managerial hubris is an agency issue which is difficult to be 
13 
 
controlled or detected. A well-known study of agency problem which represents for firm 
takeover strategy at the managerial interest is Jensen (1986). The theory implies 
managers of firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more 
likely to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers. Thus, free cash flow 
theory implies the value of shareholders of either mergers or takeovers are more likely to 
be detrimental, rather than to create values. Acquisitions are one way managers spend 
cash instead of paying it out to shareholders. Therefore, while Roll (1986) pointed out 
that mergers can be legitimized by efficient management taking over inefficient 
management; the hubris hypothesis is that the optimism of managers leads to incorrect 
beliefs about their own abilities. 
There are many discussion of the managerial efficacy of mergers and acquisitions and I 
will not rehearse here. However, bank mergers may experience something different than 
non-financial sectors. Cheng, Gup, and Wall (1989) note that bank mergers are quite 
different than nonbank mergers because of the regulatory process involved. Before a 
bank merger can occur, prior approval from one of the three federal bank regulatory 
authorities and approval at the state level are required. If an approval is granted, there is a 
waiting period in which the merger is examined. A total of four months may pass before 
the merger is approved by the government. Therefore, managerial motives or hubris are 
too difficult to exist in banking industry as a rational motivation of M&As. 
2.2.2 Market power motive of bank M&As. 
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions that have significant local market overlap may increase 
local market power and allow the consolidated bank to raise profits by setting prices 
favorable to it. This could affect interest rate and fees on retail business especially on 
local market. Thus internal market merges are more likely to gain market power than 
external market merger (or cross-border merges). Also supporting this presumption are 
the findings of VanderVennet (1997) that about half of the U.S bank mergers are internal 
market and many European bank M&As are in this type as well. However, the Antitrust 
Law of financial industry restricts the likeliness of the merger which might increase the 
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non-competitive environment for others. Consequently, the gain in market power from 
bank mergers can only realized if it is within an acceptable level. 
Similarly, while the theory behind market power enhancing profitability is 
straightforward, empirical analyses have shown unclear results from increased 
concentration. Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan (1991) demonstrate that local loan 
rates often increase alongside decreasing deposit rates following mergers that boost 
market share, thus banks with market power gain more profitable by widening their 
spreads and fees. Choice of control variables on both the demand and supply side drive 
these conflicting conclusions. This highlights the difficulty of separately identifying 
market power and efficiency effects. Nevertheless, Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) 
suggest some reasons to suspect that market power may have declined due to the two 
following reasons. First, since the removal of geographic restrictions on banking 
organization, there may be increasing that allow existing institutions to enter easily more 
objective local markets. Moreover, the development of financial innovations and the 
financial infrastructure may also have made local market more accessible. The empirical 
evidence on the mergers' gain of market power is mixed. As Hannan (1997) and Radecki 
(1998), Hannan (1998) show the relationship between local market concentration and 
deposit rate seems to have less prevailed in 1990s, although the retail loan pricing of 
banks in a concentrated market which study in Cyrnak and Hannan (1998) still appears to 
be strong. 
Despite the findings of market power in products pricing, some literature like Berger 
(1995), Maudos (1996), Berger and Hannan (1997) found quite small effects of 
concentration on bank profit, especially after statistical controls for efficiency were 
included in the analyses. Similarly, the banks that were found to have persistently higher 
profitability relative to the industry generally were those neither with high market power 
nor with the strict barriers to entry, as shown in Berger, Bonime, Covitz and Hancock 
(1998). One possible explanation given by Berger and Hannan (1998) is that market 
power may have a much greater effect on pricing power than on profits. Eventually, 
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mergers lead to increasing revenue but not in profitability if the merger is undertaken by 
weak management skill. Akhanvein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) although this study 
did not work on measuring market power through bank mergers, found very small 
changes in pricing strategy and much larger efficiency changes among large U.S banking 
institutions. The reason leads to mixed result of efficiency of raising market power 
through consolidation is the issue of statistical controlled for efficiency. Unless the 
efficiency is controlled for, effects of market power of bank mergers on prices or profits 
will not be distinguished and is the composition effect of market power and efficiency. 
Regarding the profit efficiency of bank mergers, normal profitability ratios such as the 
return on assets and equities (ROA, ROE) are used to measure the effect of M&As by 
comparing both before and after M&As relative to peer groups in the industry that did not 
engage in M&As. Rhoades(1998) found improved profitability ratios associated with 
M&As, while others Srinivasin (1992), Srinivasin and Wall (1992), Akhavein, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997), found no improvement in these ratios. There is a problem with 
these ratios that the combination of both performance changes in market power and 
changes in efficiency appear then lead to unable disentangling separately. These studies 
may be biased in the coefficients of mergers' benefits. And the use of the cost or 
profitability ratios also does not account for the fact that some product mixes cost more to 
produce than others.  
Theoretically, there are benefits associating to a bank merger such as market power, 
diversification, economies to scale and scope, managerial efficiency and access to asset 
safety net. However, empirical results are mixed whether bank mergers always profitable 
given some controlling variables to measure the profitability gaining from consolidations. 
Eventually, it cannot be deniable that consolidation in financial industry is inevitable in 




2.3 Multiple Bank Merges  
We define multiple bank merges as repeating mergers or acquisitions by one acquirer. 
The target can be the same or different in each merge deal. There are few studies 
examining on the manner of bank repeating mergers which can only explained by a 
planning-program mergers. We will add to this literature field the non-programmed 
multiple bank mergers and examine how the decision making of subsequent merger is 
affected by the previous merger.  
It is clear that a successful merge bring benefits for the acquirer or bidder even though 
empirical evidences are mixed. This is possibly explained by the fact that, each decision 
making in a merge deal is conducted to attain the main objective of the manager, thus 
there are no universal standards for a successful merge.  Some found neither profitable 
nor cost efficiency at all for the almost acquirers, however we still see that banks have 
attempted to repeat the mergers and acquisitions for many times. What is the reason 
behind the manner? Rosen (2004) argued that most of firms do merger program. And he 
considered that the mergers to be programmed if the next merge happens within the two 
years after the previous merge. He also found that programming-mergers mostly benefit 
the managers with growing compensation during the program. Thus there can be another 
explanation of why firms keep repeating mergers although they did not success in the 
previous times. Rosen (2004) also asserted that acquisitions under program are likely to 
be worse than non-programmed acquisitions and may destroy acquiring firm value which 
is consistent to the management hubris claim in merger decision making in Roll (1986). 
Regarding the evolution of a merge program, the evidence is not extensive and mixed. 
According to Asquith (1983), there was no significant difference among the CARs for the 
first four programmed-mergers while Fuller (2002) found the first acquisition has a 
higher CAR than the fifth and the following acquisitions. Taking more advantages than 
the previous studies by examining both the CARs and the post-announcement return as 
the buy-and-hold return (BHRA), Rosen (2004) found that BHRA generally has a 
positive mean but a negative median which implies that the median acquirer s’ 
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shareholders gain nothing remarkable. He also found that the CAR and BHRA of firms 
with merger program is significantly larger than other with one-off mergers. Rosen found 
some evidences suggesting that a subsequent acquisition is more likely if the post-merger 
performance was not necessarily strong enough, but when controlling for the firm 
strength, firms where CEOs get excessive compensation in a merger program are the 
reason more likely to make future acquisitions. It again supports that programmed-
mergers are more likely motivated by managerial motivation rather than the shareholders’ 
value-maximized motivation. 
There is few studies focus on gains of firms that make multiple acquisitions. According 
to Schipper and Thompson (1983) find that on the average, the effect of announcements 
generates a positive cumulative abnormal return – CAR and changes in regulation which 
reduce the value of future mergers affect negatively on firms with programmed-mergers. 
This implies future merger activity is partially priced by the market which is somehow 
consistent to the findings of Asquith (1983) and Malatesta and Thompson (1985) that the 
market does not fully price future mergers. Our main interest in this framework extends 
to the non-programming mergers by looking at how previous merge deal affects the 
decision-making of the sequential of mergers. Similar to the argument of market pricing 
participant, we will analysis on the market reaction (AR) as part of effects of previous 
merge deal to the probability of the following merge.  
Based on the findings of Rosen (2004) that the consequences of consecutive acquisitions 
might differ remarkably from those of single merge and when a firm acquires multiple 
targets, the early acquisitions the higher market return, Cohen-Cole and Kraninger (2007) 
applied similar assumption on multiple bank mergers to examine a farsighted merger 
program.  Exploring on the multi-stage search model of the long term merger planning, 
Cohen-Cole and Kraninger (2007) found that long-term merger programs will more 
likely pay a larger acquisition premium than those with no future plans.  
Doukas and Petmezas (2006) argue that management hubris as overconfident managers 
leads to the multiple acquisitions engagement because the manager believe that such 
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serial investment are most for the interest of shareholders than “rational” managers do. 
To examine the overconfident managers in relation with the shareholders’ wealth through 
acquisition, Doukas and Petmenzas (2006) used managers’ acquisitiveness (i.e propensity 
to acquire targets) within a short time as a proxy of overconfidence. Their overconfidence 
measurement stems from the belief that the undertaking of multiple acquisitions in a very 
short span of time is a poor investment and consistent with other works as Heaton (2002), 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2004). 
 
Year n           Year (n+1)   Year (n+2)…    Programming multiple mergers: 
Deal 1…    Deal2,3…      Deal m…         (Series of mergers in consecutive years) 
 
 >= 3 years 
Year n   Year (n+3)        Non-programming multiple mergers  
merger     next merger    (At least 3 years apart two mergers) 
subject merger     Non-programmed merger (*) 
(*) Non-programmed at the year n 
We find missing literatures studies on the non-programming multiple mergers. Non-
programmed merger is not intentionally decided or scheduled in 3-year advance by the 
managers of the acquirer, while the programmed-merger is scheduled to occur, not 
depends on whatever the value creation or destruction of the stockholders of the 
acquirers. For example, Bank A decided to merger with bank B in 2000, bank A also had 
decided to merger with bank C in year 2001. A series of mergers in consecutive year is 
the evidence of programming multiple mergers.  
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We are interested in testifying the effect of the subject merger to the occurrence of the 
next merger. The subject merger is the latest merger in the year n, and the next merger is 
the merger happened 3 years after the subject merger. What happen in the subject merger 




















Before we can examine the effects of previous merger deal to the probability of engaging 
in another non-programmed merger deal of firm, we formulate some testable Hypotheses 
which are based on the results of previous findings in the field of multiple bank mergers. 
We define the non-program mergers are the mergers which occur at least three year 
following the previous one. 
Hypothesis 1 
The abnormal return (AR) on stock price around the approved date of acquirer in the 
current merger has significantly negative relation of the probability of repeating merger 
of the acquirer. 
We expect the coefficient of AR is negative sign which indicate the negative correlation 
of the abnormal return of the subject merger to the occurrence of the next merger. This 
means the higher the abnormal return gained in the subject merger, the lower probability 
of repeating the next merger after 3 years or lower the probability of involve in a non-
programmed merger. It sounds strange but it might relevant and consistent to the existing 
findings of abnormal return on the acquirers’ stock price.  
According to the findings of Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz (2005) in a large sample of 
acquisitions in the recent wave, acquiring-firms massively experience the wealth 
destruction caused around the announcement date. This finding is also consistent to many 
other findings study on previous merger waves. Thus the logic behind our first hypothesis 
is that the abnormal return present in the subject merger might be negative abnormal 
return which destroys the value of its shareholders. This might prevent the acquirer from 






The management hubris of the acquirer in the previous merger is significant predictor of 
the probability of repeating merger of the acquirer. 
We use number of mergers in consecutive years which associated with the current merger 
as the proxy for the management hubris. The coefficient of the management hubris is 
unclear to the probability of repeating merger of the acquirer in a non-program merge. 
The possible explanation is that non-program merger tend to be triggered by the 
maximized shareholder’s value, thus the management hubris may play insignificant role 
or negative role. However, adding this variable is necessary because management hubris 
presented in the subject merger might influence the effect of AR of that subject merger. 
As explained later, the higher order of the merger in a sequence of mergers, the lower 
abnormal return can be found. If we assume that our subject merger is a high-ordered 
merger from a sequence of merger, thus the abnormal return of our subject merger, if 
existing, might be lower because of the influence of other previous merger in the 
sequence. Thus hubris is hidden in the AR of the subject merger if it is a high-ordered 
merger in a sequence of merger, and hubris will lower the effect of AR on the dependent 
variable.   
Hypothesis 3 
The value of the asset acquired by the acquirer in the previous merger is significant 
predictor of the probability of repeating merger. 
We expect the coefficient of the asset acquired is a negative correlated with the 
probability of repeating merger. Intuitively, the bigger the target, the riskier the acquirer 
faces. If the merger results in unexpected performance of the new entity, the acquirer 
shall be more hesitate in repeating another transaction. It will decrease the probability of 





There are two main parts in this section which are Data Description and Methodology for 
Testing Hypotheses. 
4.1 Data Description 
Mergers and Acquisitions is the most attractive phenomenon to the economic and 
financial researchers. M&A deals often occur in a complicated process which might last 
for months or years. Therefore, M&As data generally are collected and recorded by 
specialized data research institutions or organizations. The access to M&As data is not 
easy and freely for every researcher. 
In United State, where the mergers and acquisitions was triggered for hundreds years, 
there is a mechanism of merger progress in US banks. The merger applications have been 
submitted the proposal to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – FDIC since 1930s. 
“Regarding each application, the FDIC considered and found favorably with respect to 
the relevant statutory factors, including financial and managerial resource; future 
prospects of the existing and the proposed institutions; convenience and needs of the 
community to be served; and the effectiveness of each depository institution involved in 
the merger in establishing programs to combat money laundering activities, including 
overseas branches. 
…Reports regarding the competitive factors were requested from the Attorney General 
and the Summary Report by the Attorney General indicated that the transaction would 
not have a significant adverse effect on competition…” (FDIC- Mergers Decision Annual 
Report) 
We utilize the US Bank mergers data from annual reports of Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) from 2000 to 2010. A complete report of all merger applications 
approved by the FDIC during the previous calendar year is provided to Congress every 
year. There are main merger types including: regular mergers, corporate reorganization 
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mergers, interim mergers, and failed or closed bank mergers. The FDIC is a leading 
provider and a trusted source of information about the US banking industry. Thus there 
are many researchers have studied on FDIC-assisted mergers data, to name some of these 
such as Billett (1995), Cochran (1995), Zhang (1997). 
Table 1: US bank mergers data recorded by FDIC from 2000 to 2010 












2000 430 157 204 63 6 
2001 410 204 160 45 1 
2002 327 145 116 60 6 
2003 317 153 107 54 3 
2004 329 153 130 43 3 
2005 313 115 156 42 0 
2006 365 169 158 38 0 
2007 324 147 132 42 3 
2008 302 104 136 35 27 
2009 282 69 129 13 71 
2010 295 90 122 12 71 
Source: Author’s calculation based on FDIC reports 
In order to study the effects of previous merger on the probability of repeating future 
merger, we focus our analysis on the data of regular mergers. Regular merger is the 
transaction between two different partners: acquirer (bidder) and acquired (target). Each 
regular merger proposed by an applicant to the FDIC should be recorded in details with 
name of applicant institution, total assets of acquirer, name of target institution, 
certificates number of acquirer and target, value of assets acquired. 
As can be seen from table 2, year 2001 experienced a record number of regular mergers 
but the value of per transaction was not so high, stayed behind year 2000, 2009 and 2010. 
Interestingly, year 2009 had the lowest number of regular mergers but value per deal and 
value per acquirer stand the second-highest level. This can be partly explained by the fact 
that in early twentieth century, merger wave in US banking industry was still strong and 
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appealed that many bankers and institutions could not stay beyond the trend. They might 
involve in mergers to indicate its visibility and capability. Later in this period, when the 
US banking faced financial crises, bankers more seriously considered when acquired 
potential partners. The mergers should be precise and beneficial decision for bankers than 
to deteriorate the existing bad situation. That was the reason why number of mergers 
transactions fall but the quality improved by the value showed per transaction. 















2000 157 1,998,898,775 134 12,731,839.33 14,917,155.04(**) 
2001 202 46,575,899 168 230,573.76 277,237.49 
2002 143 29,956,745 126 209,487.73 237,751.94 
2003 149 29,244,830 133 196,274.03 219,885.94 
2004 148 30,547,510 129 206,402.09 236,802.40 
2005 112 23,883,660 96 213,246.96 248,788.13 
2006 166 23,302,798 136 140,378.30 171,344.10 
2007 145 24,359,624 128 167,997.41 190,309.56 
2008 102 16,311,622 99 159,917.86 164,763.86 
2009 67 56,369,240 63 841,331.94 894,749.84 
2010 89 30,002,340 78 337,104.94 384,645.38 
Source: Author’s calculation based on FDIC reports 
(*): number of regular mergers less than those in table 1 because we exclude mergers with zero or 
unrecorded value of assets acquired 
(**): the substantial high value of total asset acquired and related ratios caused by many mega-mergers 
which have made in the year2000. 
Based on the annual reports of merger decision of FDIC from 2000 to 2010, we process 
the data in favor of multiple mergers. We exclude bankers which had single merger 
during the period, and keep all acquirers which had at least 2 mergers from 2000 to 2010. 
In Appendix 1, we construct a table of list of nearly 250 banks which involved in 
multiple mergers during 10-year period. This table is our main source of our analysis on 
behavior of multiple bank mergers. Some banks merged many times, while others had 
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few. The record high level is about 24 mergers deals per one acquirer in 10 years, while 
the lowest is 2 deals of one acquirer in the same period.  
From the table in Appendix1, we categorize data into two groups: programmed mergers 
and non-programmed mergers. As explained early, we keep only non-programmed 
mergers for our analysis. Thus, repeating merger 3 years afterwards is considered a non-
programmed merger. In order to collect precise data for testing out hypotheses, we first 
check the available for the data of acquirer’s stock price. We decide to focus the stocks 
on the same stock exchange such as NASDAQ. Finally, we keep 45 multiple acquirers 
which satisfy our requirements for testing hypotheses. Chosen banks in our sample are 
bolded in the table in Appendix 1. 
Main criteria of filtering banks in the total 250 multiple acquirers: 
 Public or listed bank 
 Stock of the bank is listed on NASDAQ 
 Exclude banks which disappeared caused by later acquisitions 
In total 250 bank multiple acquirers, there are many banks which are not listed. Thus we 
drop out and keep only listed bank for our study. 
4.2 Methodology for Testing Hypotheses 
The main methodology for our purpose of constructing a prediction model of future 
merger is Logit analysis. Before hand, we use Event Study to search for the independent 
variables of interest is Abnormal return of the subject merger. We will start with Event 
Study and then investigate the methodology of Logistic Regression. 
4.2.1 Event Study Methodology 
In order to test the first hypothesis of examination the abnormal return of the previous 
merger’s effect on the decision of repeating merger after 3 years, we first use event study 
methodology to find the abnormal return (AR). Many studies on mergers and acquisitions 
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have use event studies to examine the value creation of the deal to the participants. Event 
studies are analyzed using abnormal returns of stocks of banks engaged in mergers or 
acquisitions in a certain period of time before and after the deal announcement. This 
method is broadly used to quantify the market expectations on shareholder’s value 
creation related to the merger. Normally, the data needed for the event studies is the 
merger announcement date and daily stock price of the involved parties around that date. 
The information obtained by observing abnormal returns show shareholders’ overall 
expectations. It includes the expected magnitude of efficiency gains, market power gains 
and other value creating effects compared with the announced purchase price and other 
expected costs related to the merger. The market reaction to the deal announcement 
therefore directly indicates the value implications for the target’s and the bidder’s 
shareholders separately. The event studies do not need to rely on the potentially 
manipulating of accounting numbers; they are relying on market expectation.  
Day 0 
It is important to set correctly the event day when the effective information is released. 
We relied on the approved date on FDIC reports to set the day 0. It is understandable 
because the merger can only occurred if it had been approved by FDIC. As soon as 
FDIC’s approval of the merger proposal of acquirer, the information of upcoming merger 
can be leaked out and affects the stock price of acquirer. It is not necessary to wait until 
the announcement date of the merger of the acquirer to examine the value creation on 
stock price of the merger effect because the information of a future merger has already 
known since the date of approval. Thus choosing approved day as the day 0 is appropriate 
in case of our data sample provided by FDIC.  
Event window 
Literatures of event study show that there is no standard of days in event window. Event 
window is differed from authors to authors. Most of event studies chose the short event 
window of 3 to 5 days around the event date. Schipper and Smith (1986), Klein, 
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Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991) use event window [-4,0], while Slovin Sushka and Ferraro 
(1995) use event window [0,1] or Hullburt (2003) use [-1,0]. Many researchers use event 
window [-1,1] such as Allen and McConnell (1998), Vijh (1999,2002), Mulherin and 
Boone (2000), Wagner (2004). Longer event windows are also used such as [-30,+30] in 
Campa and Hernando (2005) or [-40,+40] in Tourani-Rad and Van Beek (1999). The 
event window can be chosen depends on each researchers in order to capture the correct 
market reaction of the event. The event can be short to capture the correct market reaction 
on the event day, also it can be long enough to measure how large the market reaction can 
be.  
In order to observe the market reaction around the approval of the merger, using 
methodology of Klemmer, Kengelbach, Schwetzler and Sperling (2011), we chose an 
event window [-3;+3]. Our 7-day event window might be not enough to capture the 
magnitude of abnormal return of the effect of the merger approval on the stock price, still 
it can be at least enough to test for the existing of abnormal return around the approval 
date. The effect of the merger can last till the announcement date and even days after the 
announcement date. However, our interest in this framework is to find out the effect of 
the subject merger on the probability of repeating a future merger after at least 3 years of 
the acquirer. Therefore, a part of abnormal return is enough for our analysis. In the event 
window, we will search for abnormal return from day -3 to day +3 around the approval 
date. Testing for the significance of abnormal return is described in the following 
sections. 
Estimation Window 
Estimation window is the period over which the market model parameters are estimated. 
It excludes the approval day and the announcement day in order to avoid any effect of the 
approval day and the announcement day on the estimation of parameters. The length of 
the estimation window differs from study to study. We chose estimation window of 126 
days before the day 0, [-132;-7]. This estimation window is approximately 6 months. It is 
quite a short estimation window in comparison with normal 1-year estimation window. 
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The reason is that almost our sample is multiple mergers, it means acquirers in our 
sample often have a sequence of mergers during the research period, thus a long estimate 
window might not precise in estimate a correct market model. Notably, we exclude one 
month (January of year n+1) if the estimate window spans from year n to year n+1 
because of the earnings announcement effect on January every year can distort the market 
model parameters.  
Market Model 
In order to estimate parameters, we applied standard market model (Brown and Warner, 
1984; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Beitel and Schiereck, 2001; Fritsch et al., 2007). 
The market model has the following form: 
                 
where     is the observed return on security i = 1,…,46 in trading day t є[-132;-7] and 
    is the observed market return (NASDAQ composite index) in day t. The returns were 
calculated as follows: 
       
  
    
  
Where    and      are the close prices in day t and t-1 respectively, obtained from 
NASDAQ. We applied the OLS regression to estimate the market model parameters   , 
   for each stock i. 
Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return (AR) on a stock I in day t є[-3;+3] is calculated as the difference 
between the observed return     and the expected return      : 
                               
Where     and     are the estimated parameters.  
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Test for Significance 
We applied a method proposed by Brown and Warner (1984). The test statistic for the 
null hypothesis that the observed abnormal returns are statistically indifferent from zero 
(99% level of confidence) is: 
  
   
       
 
The test statistic is specified as abnormal returns standardized by standard deviation 
estimated over the estimation period [-132;-7]. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can 
conclude that the stock price had been actually impacted by the merger. 
The standard deviation of the abnormal return over the estimate window is: 
       = 
              
  
      
   
    where          
 
   
     
  
       
Average abnormal return (AAR) is defined as: 
     
    
                                         
 where     is the abnormal return 
realized in any day in event window 
4.2.2 Logistic Regression 
Our main methodology in this research is the logistic regression. This is model of limited 
dependent variable. If we define our dependent variable is y which is the probability of 
repeating merger at least 3 years after the previous merger. We define the dependent 
variable y as followed:  
y = 1 if the acquirer has the next merger at least 3 year after the subject merger; 0 if there 
is no merger at least 3 years apart from the subject merger.  
The dependent variable is binomial thus using linear regression OLS for estimation of 
parameters can be bias. To solve this problem, Logistic regression is used to eliminate the 
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bias of OLS on binomial dependent variable. Dietrich (1984) had used logit analysis to 
predict a merger target. 
 Our main interest in this thesis is to find out the correlation of y and 3 explanatory 
variables (   . They are: 
AR: Abnormal return 
The first independent variable, AR, is clearly defined and calculated by the event study 
explained above. The probability of repeating merger might be impacted by the results of 
market reaction in the previous merger. What happen on the previous merger in the past 
might influence the expectation of market of future merger if it happens. In order to avoid 
the robustness of the value of abnormal return caused by the different event window, we 
decide to label AR as a binomial variable. We focus our analysis on the appearance of 
abnormal return, not the true value of abnormal return. Thus we define the variable AR as 
followed: 
AR =1 if there is significant abnormal return caused by the event in any day in the period 
of event window; and 0 if there is no significant abnormal return in the period of event 
window 
HUBRIS: Management hubris presented in the previous merger 
The second independent variable, HUBRIS, is defined as the managerial motive of series 
of merger transaction associated with the previous merger. According to Doukas and 
Petmezas (2006), overconfident manager tend to underestimate the risks, or overestimate 
the synergy gains, associated with mergers and therefore they are less likely to postpone a 
merger decision. They argue that overconfident managers are prone to engage in multiple 
mergers since they strongly believe that such serial investment decisions are in the best 
interest of shareholders than “rational” managers do. Thus, managerial motive manifests 
in multiple mergers within a short period of time. The findings of Doukas and Petmezas 
(2006) are consistent with the findings of Billet and Qian (2005), although the former 
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focus on the private acquisition and the later studied on the public form. When examining 
multiple acquirers’ wealth effects in low-order (1
st
 deals) and high-order (5
th
 or more 
deals) mergers conducted within a three-year period, they point out that if self-attribution 
bias develops managerial overconfidence, high-order mergers will be associated with 
lower wealth effects than low-order mergers. Thus management hubris does impact on 
the wealth effect of the high-order merger in a sequence of mergers. When using AR as 
an independent variable to predict the probability of repeating non-programmed merger, 
the coefficient of AR may be bias is this AR is of the high-order merger in a sequence of 
merger and be influenced by the effect of HUBRIS on high-order wealth effect. 
Therefore, without adding HUBRIS, the coefficient of AR in case of sequence mergers 
may be strongly bias, which does not exclude the effect of HUBRIS on AR.  
Our methodology of identifying management hubris is consistent with Malmendier and 
Tate (2004) and Doukas and Petmezas (2006), which is stated that doing multiple 
mergers in a year is likely indicator of management hubris. For example, if in a single 
year n, acquirer i acquired 2 times or more, we will categorize this acquirer with 
HUBRIS effect.  
We define variable HUBRIS as follow: 
HUBRIS = 1 if the acquirer has multiple mergers in consecutive years; and 0 if it has 
only a single merger.  
AA: Value of the asset acquired by the acquirer 
The third independent variable, AA, is the value of asset acquired which is approved and 






We applied logistic regression to find the value of dependent variable y: 
Logit                 
We expect significant correlation implied as    of independent variable and dependent 
variable. Thus the independent variable can be significant predictor of y and marginal 
effect of independent variable on y can be measured by derivation from logit function. In 
order to find out the best model, we might introduce control variables to testify the 
variance of the explanatory s’ coefficient when controlling for some factors. The main 
criterion for choosing a best prediction model is that the model should have the highest 
goodness-of-fit and high power of prediction. 
Thus we have derivation from the chosen Logit function: 
   
 
   
              
 
   
               
  
             











5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Findings on Event Studies 
Using event studies on examining the effect of approved date made by FDIC on the 
merger of US banks, we find some significant impacts of the information on the stock 
price of the requested bank. Over the whole sample of 46 banks, we find 30% of the total 
banks have abnormal return. Others have no significant abnormal return due to the event. 
14 out of 45 banks have recorded significant abnormal returns due to the event, while half 
of them have positive abnormal return and half have negative abnormal return. The result 
shows unclear pattern over the whole sample of abnormal return. However, our result is 
somehow consistent to many studies on examining effect of merger and acquisitions 
announcement on the stock price of acquirers. Findings show that almost acquirers 
experience no abnormal return or negative abnormal return.  
Previous study on the FDIC assisted acquisitions such as Zhang (1997) found that 
repeated acquirers, on average, have positive abnormal returns. Our empirical result is 
different in the two assumptions. Firstly, we focus on the approval date, not the 
announcement date; secondly, the abnormal return is of the subject merger, which is 
defined as the latest merger in a sequence of mergers. Thus the abnormal return of the 
subject merger might be diminished. 
The distribution of AR is statistically described in table 3 and table 4. The highest 
frequency of realized abnormal return is on day [-1] with 24% of the total AR realized 
days. Day [-3] contributes 12% of the AR realized days, which is the lowest frequency 
day.  
In the sub sample of realized abnormal return (14 valid observations), 57% of the banks 
have negative abnormal return and 43% have positive abnormal return. Table 4 is 
summary statistics of abnormal return of the sub sample. The highest abnormal return 
recorded is 10.8% and the lowest abnormal return is -10%. Average abnormal return of 
34 
 
the sub sample is quite small, -0.8%. 
Table 3:  Event Study results on the whole sample 
Summary Statistics, using the observations 1 - 45 
for the variable AR (45 valid observations) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
-0.00240217 0.000000 -0.100000 0.108000 
 Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
0.0318297 13.2504 0.317550 5.34125 
    
Table 4: Event Study Results of significant abnormal return 
Summary Statistics, using the observations 1 – 45 
for the variable SAR (14 valid observations) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
-0.00789286 -0.0113000 -0.100000 0.108000 
 Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. Kurtosis 
0.0588244 7.45287 0.470067 -0.266677 
Our evidence of abnormal return around the approval date asserts that the decision of 
FDIC on the merger proposal of bankers does have impact on the stock price of the 
acquirers. Examining the stock price change around the approval date might partially 
reflect the market expectation on the up-coming merger of the bank. Thus in further 
studying, we can project and extrapolate the market reaction around the announcement 
date of the merger by using the market reaction in the previous event of approval date.  
Logistic Analysis 
Logistic analysis in Model 1found significant estimation of the coefficient of abnormal 
return (AR) is -1.94, which is significant at 99% confident level. The coefficient of AR is 
negative and significant as expectation which means that the appearance of abnormal 
return in the current merger will lower the probability of repeating the next merger apart 
at least three years from now. Model 2 found that the coefficient of HUBRIS is -1.31, 
which is significant at 90% level of confidence. This reflects that the HUBRIS presented 
in the subject merger will lower the probability of involving a next merger at least 3 years 
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afterwards. The results of estimation on the coefficient of AR and HUBRIS are as 
significant and meaningful as our expectations. In Model 3, we found meaningless of the 
relationship of the value of asset acquired on the dependent variable. From these results, 
Model 1 should be chosen because it has the highest good-of-fitness of the model which 
is indicated through R-square and the Log-likelihood. Although the coefficients also 
significant as expectation, any interpretation for the marginal effect of the explanatory on 
the dependent variable need to be clarified further by adding control variables to the right 
hand side of the regression in Model 1. 
Table 5: Logistic analysis of y on individual explanatory variable 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Const 1.65 1.31 0.65 
  (3.376)*** (3.082)*** (-1.63) 
AR -1.94     
  (-2.659)***     
HUBRIS   -1.31   
    (-1.829)*   
AA     8.87E-08 
      (-0.73) 
Correct Prediction 76% 71% 71% 
McFadden R^2 0.14 0.06 0.04 
Log-likelihood -23.26 -25.37 -26.11 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; (***) (**) and (*) are signs denoted the significant at 
99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence, respectively 
We chose a set of control variables which are HUBRIS, AA and the total assets of 
acquirer (TA). The main explanation for this chosen set of control variables is to 
investigate the impact of rescaling and confounding on the effect of AR on dependent 
variable. When we test for the correlation of control variables and AR, both AA and TA 
have zero correlation with AR, while HUBRIS has significant correlation to AR. 
Therefore, controlling this set of diversified variables can clarify our result.  
Notably, in case of control variable HUBRIS, we inspired by the finding of Karlson, 
Holm and Breen (2010) which state that the interpretation of coefficient in nonlinear 
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model can be biased caused by the inclusion of confounding variables if researchers use 
traditional method of Average Partial Effects (APE). The most typical identification of 
confounding variable is the correlation to explanatory variable. When we compare the 
coefficient of explanatory variable between the reduce model (without controlling for 
confounding variable) and the full model (with controlling for confounding variable), the 
difference can be reduced caused by the off-set of confounding and rescaling. The 
conclusion from the full model of the impact of confounding variable on the marginal 
effect of explanatory variable on depend variable will be not correct. In our case, 
HUBRIS is considered as confounding variable. When the full model produced by adding 
HUBRIS to Model 1 had justified as superior to Model 1, we will need to apply a new 
method of Karlson, Holm and Breen (2010) to interpret precisely the effect of 
confounding variable.  
Return to our experiment of introducing control variable into Model 1. The results of 
logistic regression of y on AR when controlling for HUBRIS, AA, and TA are presented 
in table 6 as Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6, respectively. All three models result in 
significant change of the coefficient of AR in comparison with the original Model 1. In 
Model 4, introducing of control variable HUBRIS had increased the effect of AR on y by 
8.8%. When controlling for AA in Model 5, the coefficient of AR had increased slightly 
smaller than the previous case, at 7.2%.  In contrast, Model 5 show a substantial decrease 
from -1.94 (Model 1) to -2.36, which is approximately 21.6%, of the AR coefficient. 
What would be the best model for our purpose when controlling for variables HUBRIS, 
AA and TA had different response on the coefficient of AR on dependent variable? Using 
the method proposed in Baltagi (2005), we apply the log likelihood ratio to decide on the 
best model. The method is simply for application with the test of null hypothesis that the 
addition of specific variable (the full model) makes no difference with respect to the 
original regression without adding that specific variable (reduced model). The test 
statistic is defined as the double of the difference between the 2 log-likelihood of the full 
model and the reduced model. The t statistic is asymptotic    at one degree of freedom 
(as in our case). As we can see from table 6, the row “Test statistic” show that the Model 
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6 is significant difference than our original model which is model 1. Compare to Model 
1, Model 6 has higher goodness-of-fit and also have higher correct prediction power. 
Table 6: Logistic regression of AR on y when controlling for HUBRIS, AA, TA 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Const 1.90079 1.43764 2.4062 
 
(3.453)*** (2.579)*** (3.428)*** 
AR -1.77538 -1.8045 -2.356 
 




















80% 76% 79.10% 
McFadden R^2 0.17 0.16 0.27 
Log-likelihood -22.43 -22.8 -19.16 
Test Statistic 
(  ) 
2.06 0.92 8.2*** 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios; (***) (**) and (*) are signs denoted the significant 
at 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence, respectively 
Relating to Model 4 with confounding variable HUBRIS, Model 4 is justified not better 
than the Model 1, therefore it does not need to analysis further because of its inefficiency 
in comparison to Model 1. 
Through many steps of analyzing and discussion, we believe that Model 6 is the most 
efficient and suitable model for our study purpose. Model 6 has highest goodness-of-fit 
(McFadden R-square at 27%) and correct prediction power (correction prediction at 79%) 
Derivation of dependent variable from Model 6: (We rescale TA by unit of Million USD) 
                              
    
 
   




   
                          
  
                        
                          
 
 
This is our prediction model:   
                       
                          
 
The marginal effect of AR is -31.87%. This means, one unit increase in Abnormal Return 
in the current merger or the appearance of abnormal return will decrease 31.87% of the 
probability of making a next merger at least 3 year afterward. 
Our results are quite reasonable and connected to Post-Merger Integration (PMI) 
proposed in Klemmer, Kengelbach, Schwetzler and Sperling (2011). While studying on a 
very huge sample of approximate 25,000 global serial mergers in all industries from 
1980s to 2010, the authors confirm the PMI on the average time of integration after serial 
mergers. Those serial mergers in this study are assumed equivalence of programming 
merger and non-programming merger. Our study complements on this study by analyzing 
on bank industry with multiple non-programming mergers. With multiple non-
programming mergers, the subsequence merger is impacted by the very closely previous 
merger. Higher probability of the subsequence merger’s occurrence is negative correlated 
to the realized abnormal return and hubris management in that previous merger. This 
result can be interpreted in the way that the integration and recovery progress of the 
merger will have significant impact on the acquirer when it considers a future subsequent 
merger. Apparently, a merger taken by maximizing-shareholder’s value motivation 
should have no value wealth destruction because there is no negative abnormal return or 
management hubris, thus it will have quick recovery and integration progress which 
enables the acquirer might consider a next merger. In contrast, a merger motivated by 
management hubris will deteriorate the acquirer value and disturb acquirers’ shareholder, 
thus it will have slow post-merger integration and recovery. This consequence will lower 




The main goal of this thesis is to construct a model of prediction a non-programmed 
future merger base on the characteristics of the current merger in the case of multiple 
mergers in US banking industry. For this purpose, we studied 45 bankers in the period 
between 2000 and 1010. We tested 3 hypotheses concerning the relationship of the 
subject merger’s characteristics and the probability of future merger’s occurrence.   
There are 2 main points in our empirical findings. The first contribution is that, to our 
best knowledge, we found the significant abnormal return of acquirers’ stock price 
around the approved date made by FDIC. This illustrates the effect and information 
prudential of FDIC in regard of the merger decision on US bank mergers. Thus, 
examining the stock price change around the approval date might partially reflect the 
market expectation on the up-coming merger of the bank. For further studying, we can 
study to project and extrapolate the market reaction around the announcement date of the 
merger by using the market reaction in the previous event of approval date. 
The second contribution of this thesis is our prediction model which can produce 79% of 
correct prediction of the acquirers’ decision of making a future merger based on the 
characteristics of the current merger. From our prediction model, we found that the 
probability that the acquirer will make a next merger at least 3 year after the current 










Multiple mergers from 2000 to 2010 (*) 
BANK 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Regions Bank  2                     
First american bank 1     1               
West Alabama Bank & Trust 1         1     1     
East-West Bank 1     1 1             
Cathay Bank 1     1     1 1       
Bank of the West 2 1 1     1       1   
Summit Bank 1 1                   
Peoples Bank 1           1 1       
Citizens Bank 5 1   1               
First Hawaiian Bank 1 1                   
Mountain West Bank 3     1 1 1           
Chicago Community Bank 1 1           1       
Standard Bank and Trust Company 1     3               
Jacksonville Savings Bank 1 1                   
First State Bank of Western Illinois 1       2             
Morton Community Bank 1         1 1 1       
The German American Bank 1           6       2 
The Peoples Bank 1   1           1 1   
Sabine State Bank and Trust Company 1   1 1 1             
Rockland Trust Company 1       1       1     
South Shore Savings Bank 1       1             
Provident Bank of Maryland 1               1     
Signature Bank 1       1     1       
Northwestern Savings Bank & Trust 1   1                 
First State Community Bank 2           2   1   3 
Regional Missouri Bank 1           1         
BancorpSouth Bank 6   1   2 1 1         
Stockman Bank of Montana 1 3       1           
The Fidelity Bank 2     1               
The Heritage Bank 2 1             1 1   
Bank of Davie 1 1                   
Southern Bank and Trust Company 2   1 1 1             
Capital Bank 1               1     
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company 3   1 2 2             
First Bank 1 3   1     1         
The Berlin City Bank 1 1                   
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The Trust Company of New Jersey 1   1                 
Hudson United Bank 1 1                   
Beacon Federal 1 1                   
Union State Bank 1       1             
The Oneida Savings Bank     1         1       
Richmond County Savings Bank 1 1                   
 Bank of the Cascades 1     1     1         
Fidelity Savings Bank 1 1 1                 
Northwest Savings Bank 1 5 1 1   1 1 1   1   
FirstBank of Puerto Rico 1   1           1     
First-Citizens Bank and Trust  
Company of South Carolina 
3 1   4               
Carolina First Bank 1   1   1       1     
Farmers State Bank 1 1   1   2         1 
Greene County Bank 1 1   1 1 1   1       
Community Bank & Trust 2                     
First Prosperity Bank 1 1                   
The First State Bank 1         1 2     1 1 
American State Bank 1               1     
The Bank of Southside Virginia 1 1                   
The Cowlitz Bank 1         1           
Vision Bank   1     1 1           
Bank of the Ozarks   1   1  1             
Heritage Oaks Bank   1           1       
Affinity Bank   2                   
Salisbury Bank and Trust Company   1      1     1   1   
Liberty Bank   1     1   1     1 1 
American Savings Bank   1 1                 
Juniper Bank   2                   
Old Florida Bank   1   1               
Prosperity Bank   2 4 4 2 2 2 5 1   2 
First State Bank   2     1   1         
Citizens State Bank   1   1 1     1 1     
Casey State Bank   1     1             
Union Savings Bank   1                 1 
Blackhawk State Bank   1   1               
The Peoples State Bank of Newton   1 1             1   
Bloomfield State Bank   1           1       
The Peoples State Bank   3                   
First Bank and Trust   1               1   
Liberty Bank and Trust Company   1   1           1   
The Provident Bank   1 1 1 1     1       
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The Boston Bank of Commerce   1 1                 
Compass Bank for Savings   1   1 1             
Shoreline Bank   2                   
Independent Bank - South Michigan   1           1       
Citizens Bank and Trust Company   2                   
Allegiant Bank   1   1               
Delta Bank & Trust   2                   
Hancock Bank   2                   
MountainBank   2                   
Lincoln State Bank   1 1                 
Security First Bank   1                 1 
Hudson River Bank & Trust Company   1 1                 
North Fork Bank   1     1             
 Berkshire Bank   1      1  1 1  2       
New York Community Bank   1   1       2       
Advantage Bank   1     1             
First Bank & Trust Company   1 1   1     1     1 
Premier West Bank   1   1               
Umpqua Bank   7 1   1     1       
Fulton Bank   2       1       1   
Parkvale Savings Bank   1     1             
Royal Bank of Pennsylvania   1 1                 
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania   1 2 1               
Sun Bank   3                   
F&M Bank   1 2                 
First Volunteer Bank of Tennessee   3                   
First Bank & Trust East Texas   2                   
Sterling Bank   1           2       
Merrick Bank   1       1           
Banner Bank   1           2       
Peoples Bank of North Alabama     1 1               
Citizens Business Bank     1 1   1   1       
First Bank & Trust     1 1   1 1         
United Commercial Bank     2 1   3 1 1       
Main Street Bank   1 1                 
Pinnacle Bank     1         1 1   1 
Cresco Union Savings Bank     1     1           
United Community Bank     2 2 2   2     1   
Banterra Bank     1         1       
People's Trust Company     2                 
Patriots Bank     2       1   1     
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The Citizens State Bank     1               1 
The Morrill and Janes B & T Co.     2                 
The Bank of Kentucky     1         1   1   
Citizens Bank of Massachusetts     1 2               
Independent Bank     1   3     1     1 
Peoples Community State Bank     1       1         
The Citizens Bank of Philadelphia   1 1                 
Yadkin Valley Bank and Trust Co.     1 1       1   1   
RBC Centura Bank     2       1         
Bank of North Carolina     1       1         
Great Western Bank     1   2 2 1 1   3 1 
Bank of Nevada     2                 
Oak Hill Banks     1   1 1           
Armstrong Bank     1           2     
Brentwood Bank     1         1       
S&T Bank     1           1     
Standard Bank, PaSB     1     1           
Eurobank     1   1             
R-G Premier Bank of Puerto Rico     1 1               
Firstbank of Puerto Rico      1           1     
First-Citizens Bank and Trust Company     2                 
The Weakley County Bank     3                 
Citizens Tri-County Bank     1     1           
Texas Bank     1       1         
First State Bank Central Texas     2   1 1     1     
State Bank of Cross Plains     1       1       1 
Waumandee State Bank     1   1     1       
First Financial Bank       2 3             
First Security Bank       1         1   1 
Bank of Stockton       1           1   
FirsTier Bank       2               
Community Bank of Florida   1   1               
Iowa State Bank       1       1       
Security State Bank       1         1 1 1 
Enterprise Bank       1     1         
Premier Bank       1 1 1   1       
Timberwood Bank       1       1       
Liberty Bank of Arkansas         1   1         
Central Valley Community Bank         1       1     
The New Haven Savings Bank         2             
WashingtonFirst Bank         1 1 1         
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Lincoln Savings Bank         1       1     
Panhandle State Bank       1 1             
Community State Bank         3   1         
Eastern Bank         1     1 1   1 
Androscoggin Savings Bank         1   1         
United Prairie Bank - Owatonna         2             
Town & Country Bank         1           1 
First South Bank         1 1           
Nevada Security Bank         1   1         
Cattaraugus County Bank         1       1     
First Columbia Bank & Trust Co.         1   1   1     
First Commonwealth Bank       1 1   1         
Mid Penn Bank         1   1         
Farmer's and Merchants Bank         1           1 
Franklin Bank       2 2 3 1 1       
State Bank 1       1   1         
Towne Bank         1           1 
Community First Bank   1     1             
Citizens Bank & Savings Company           1 1         
Colorado East Bank & Trust           1   1 1     
NewAlliance Bank           2 1         
MainSource Bank           1 1     1   
Hillcrest Bank           1 1         
Community Trust Bank           1         1 
Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company 
          1 1         
Community Central Bank       1   1           
Sun Security Bank           1 1         
Great Southern Bank           1         1 
Mid-Missouri Bank           1 1         
State Bank & Trust Company           1 1 1       
Laconia Savings Bank           1     1     
First Republic Bank           1 1       1 
Woori America Bank       1   1           
First United Bank and Trust Company           2           
Keystone Nazareth Bank & Trust 
Company 
          2           
Clearfield Bank & Trust Company           2           
The Legacy Bank       1   1           
Minersville Safe Deposit Bank and 
Trust Company 
      1   1           
Beneficial Mutual Savings Bank           1   1       
First Citizens Bank and Trust Company           3 1 1 1     
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Bank of the South           1     1     
First State Bank of Uvalde           1 1         
Peoples State Bank           1         1 
Union Bank           1   1       
U.S. Bank Trust Interim             5         
Farmers Bank             2         
Bank of Florida             1 1       
Hamilton State Bank             1   1     
American Banking Company             2         
United Bank of Iowa   1         1       1 
Beardstown Savings       1     1         
First State Bank of Campbell Hill       1     1         
Meridian Bank             1 1       
Security Bank of Kansas City             2         
The Citizens Bank       1     1 2       
Kentucky Bank       1     1         
Bridgewater Savings Bank             1     1   
First Community Bank   1         1     1   
Merchants and Farmers Bank   1         3         
Shinhan Bank America             1 1       
ACB             2         
Reliance Savings Bank             2         
CommunityBanks             1 2       
Allegheny Valley Bank of Pittsburgh             1 1       
Peoples State Bank of Commerce             2         
Happy State Bank             1   1 1 1 
Carter Bank & Trust             10         
Passumpsic Savings Bank             1   1     
Frontier Bank             1 1       
AmericanWest Bank             1 1       
Sterling Savings Bank             1 1       
The Port Washington State Bank             2         
The Bancorp Bank               1   1   
First Choice Community Bank               2       
Security Savings Bank       1       1       
The Bank of Protection               1     1 
PBI Bank               2       
Danversbank               1   1   
Legacy Banks               1   1   
Mechanics' Co-operative Bank               1 1     
The Miners State Bank               1   1   
46 
 
Exchange State Bank   1           1   1   
Citizens Union State Bank and Trust       1       2       
United Central Bank               1 1     
International Bank of Commerce               2       
Columbia State Bank               2       
AnchorBank               1     1 
Marshfield Savings Bank               1 1     
Security Bank       1       1       
Source: Author’s calculation based on FDIC reports 
(*) This list of US Bank- multiple acquirers- is collected manually from annual reports of 
FDIC from 2000 to 2010. The figures represent number of merger transaction in the 
corresponding year. The bolted banks are the banks which we choose for our research of 
multiple non-programmed mergers.  
We identify any two mergers from the same acquirer in which one merger happens next 
to the other with at least 3 year apart. The proceeding merger is label as the “subject 
merger” and the latter merger is the “non-programmed merger”. We then assess the 












Model 1: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 1.64866 0.488325 3.3761 0.00074 *** 
AR -1.93634 0.728099 -2.6594 0.00783 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.711111  S.D. dependent var  0.192375 
McFadden R-squared  0.140297  Adjusted R-squared  0.066365 
Log-likelihood -23.25662  Akaike criterion  50.51323 
Schwarz criterion  54.12656  Hannan-Quinn  51.86025 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 34 (75.6%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.192 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(1) = 7.59061 [0.0059] 
 
 
Model 2: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 1.31219 0.425815 3.0816 0.00206 *** 
HUBRIS -1.31219 0.717393 -1.8291 0.06738 * 
 
Mean dependent var  0.711111  S.D. dependent var  0.200014 
McFadden R-squared  0.062150  Adjusted R-squared -0.011782 
Log-likelihood -25.37063  Akaike criterion  54.74127 
Schwarz criterion  58.35459  Hannan-Quinn  56.08828 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 32 (71.1%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.200 







Model 3: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 0.653058 0.400711 1.6297 0.10315  
AA 8.96819e-07 1.23478e-06 0.7263 0.46766  
 
Mean dependent var  0.711111  S.D. dependent var  0.137818 
McFadden R-squared  0.038466  Adjusted R-squared -0.035466 
Log-likelihood -26.01134  Akaike criterion  56.02267 
Schwarz criterion  59.63600  Hannan-Quinn  57.36969 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 32 (71.1%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.138 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(1) = 2.08117 [0.1491] 
 
 
Model 4: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 1.90079 0.550439 3.4532 0.00055 *** 
AR -1.77538 0.747754 -2.3743 0.01758 ** 
HUBRIS -1.0131 0.784281 -1.2918 0.19644  
 
Mean dependent var  0.711111  S.D. dependent var  0.189400 
McFadden R-squared  0.170748  Adjusted R-squared  0.059850 
Log-likelihood -22.43286  Akaike criterion  50.86571 
Schwarz criterion  56.28570  Hannan-Quinn  52.88623 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 36 (80.0%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.189 







Model 5: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 1.43764 0.557494 2.5788 0.00992 *** 
AR -1.80405 0.736396 -2.4498 0.01429 ** 
AA 5.44151e-07 1.2058e-06 0.4513 0.65179  
 
Mean dependent var  0.711111  S.D. dependent var  0.152595 
McFadden R-squared  0.156999  Adjusted R-squared  0.046101 
Log-likelihood -22.80481  Akaike criterion  51.60962 
Schwarz criterion  57.02961  Hannan-Quinn  53.63014 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 34 (75.6%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.153 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(2) = 8.49422 [0.0143] 
 
 
Model 6: Logit, using observations 1-45 
Dependent variable: y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z p-value  
const 2.4062 0.701872 3.4283 0.00061 *** 
AR -2.35603 0.823277 -2.8618 0.00421 *** 
TA -2.93235e-07 2.00549e-07 -1.4622 0.14370  
 
Mean dependent var  0.697674  S.D. dependent var  0.201102 
McFadden R-squared  0.272861  Adjusted R-squared  0.159014 
Log-likelihood -19.16110  Akaike criterion  44.32219 
Schwarz criterion  49.60580  Hannan-Quinn  46.27062 
 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 34 (79.1%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.201 
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